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problem. Despite the historical and ethical complications, the benefits were 
sufficiently symmetric, large and tangible for cooperation to emerge.
Cooperation will fail if a solution is perceived to be unfair. While the 
‘incremental cost’ rule seems fair, it only covers the cost of providing public 
goods, not the benefits of doing so. For instance, faced with the prospect 
of minimal transfers to them for biodiversity conservation, Cameroon and 
Ecuador have issued threats to the international community to deforest the 
Ngoyla-Mintom and the Yasuni National Parks respectively. They are seeking 
to receive a greater share of the credits for sequestered carbon. 
Such disputes reveal the importance of bargaining power and credible 
threats, which can arise from asymmetric endowments of global public 
goods, such as primary forests (see Groom et al., Forthcoming 2010). Such 
asymmetries are pertinent to the issue of climate change since payments for 
avoided deforestation can be crucial to agreement.
The Problem with Climate Change
Climate change is problematic in many of the aspects discussed above. 
Setting aside uncertainties in the science, mitigation is costly (1-5% of GDP in 
2005 according to Stern, 2007). It also requires structural changes to energy, 
transport and other economic systems. More problematic is that the benefits 
and costs of mitigation are distributed asymmetrically over space and time. 
The benefits accrue only in 50 to 200+ years, making agreement on inter-
generational justice crucial to cooperation. Ostensibly, the ethics on this 
issue are clear: current generations ought not to dump their waste ‘over the 
fence’ into the future. However, not all countries share this normative view. 
China and India emphasise the need for growth and poverty reduction now. 
The Copenhagen Accord was an attempt to share the costs of the mitigation of 
climate change between developed and developing countries. However, it lacked any 
binding commitments, such as on targets for reducing emissions, sharing burdens or 
transferring resources, which would have been necessary for cooperation.
Cooperation has been achieved on other important international issues, such as small 
pox vaccinations and the depletion of the ozone by CFCs. So, why has cooperation on 
climate change been so difficult to reach? 
International cooperation depends on many factors. First, a consensus must exist 
on the science and empirics of an issue. This implies agreement that a problem 
indeed exists, and that both the solution and associated costs and benefits have been 
identified. 
The structure of incentives is also of paramount importance. For example, how strong 
is the incentive to free-ride? Or what is the intra- and inter-temporal distribution of cost 
and benefits? The voluntary nature of international agreements means that the sharing 
of both the burden and the benefit is a central issue. 
Ethical issues, such as differences in conceptions of fairness and justice, can sometimes 
stymie cooperation. The history of activities is often also important since past actions 
can determine outcomes today, as well as perceived responsibilities and levels of trust. 
Even luck can sometimes play a role.
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Smallpox and Ozone Depletion
The voluntary provision of global public goods requires that incentives 
are aligned via agreed benefit and burden sharing. However, some global 
public goods are easier to supply than others. For example, in 1980 the 
World Health Assembly in Geneva announced as its goal the eradication 
of smallpox. And in 1989 the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting 
Substances was ratified. So, why have these global public goods been 
provided and not climate change mitigation?
The conditions for success on smallpox and ozone were favourable in many 
of the respects described above. On smallpox, the science was clear and a 
low-risk vaccine already existed. Incentives were aligned since the benefits 
of eradication were large, equally distributed across the developing and 
developed world, and immediate and tangible. 
Fairness deemed that developed countries should bear the larger burden of 
cost. So the ethics of smallpox were straightforward and arguments about 
historical responsibility were irrelevant. And the large benefits made burden 
sharing easy.
For ozone, the science was also clear. The hole in the ozone layer, its 
cause and impacts were all well understood. The benefits of action were 
symmetrically distributed across space and time. Also, the benefits, such as 
reduced skin cancers and cataracts, were immediate and tangible. Crucially, 
the availability of cheap alternatives to ozone depleting substances made 
switching technologies cost-effective. 
Agreement was reached on providing restorative payments to cover 
the costs of compliance of developing countries. This was the so-called   
‘incremental cost’ mechanism. This arrangement seemed fair because of 
income disparities between developed and developing countries and the 
recognition that developed countries had contributed most to the 
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So disagreements on intergenerational justice preclude a shared view on the 
urgency of the problem.
Furthermore, the intra-generational distribution of the benefits of mitigation 
heavily favours developing countries. For example, left unmitigated, the cost 
of climate change could be at least 3% of GDP by 2100 in SE Asia and Africa, 
compared to only about 1% in developed countries (Stern, 2007). These 
costs include a drop of agricultural yields of 20% in Africa, for instance.
Given these asymmetries, historical responsibility can guide perceptions 
of fairness and influence bargaining positions. For instance, the ‘Brazilian 
Proposal’ prior to the earlier Kyoto Agreement was an attempt to allocate 
emissions reductions among developed countries on the basis of their 
historical emissions. In its raw form this approach embodies the principle of 
strict liability: if ‘you broke it, you pay for it’. But many developed countries 
disagree with this stance, and point to the absence of information on climate 
change in the past.
So mitigation is costly, and whether across time or space, those who ought 
to act are usually not those who benefit. Distributional and ethical disputes 
are then unavoidable, making it difficult to agree temperature limits and 
emissions reductions, the appropriate sharing of burdens, and the transfers 
of technology and finance.
The Previous Kyoto Agreement
The Kyoto Agreement recognised such asymmetries in its principle of 
‘equal but differentiated responsibility’. It also fostered many flexible 
mechanisms—such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
emissions trading—which aim to improve efficiency in mitigation for 
developed countries. 
But the exclusion of developing countries from the Kyoto commitments, 
the small scale of the EU Emissions Trading System (covering less than 1% 
of required global emissions reductions), and the inadequacies of the CDM 
mean that the agreement was inefficient and ineffective due to ‘leakage’: 
the movement of CO2 production to developing countries. To be effective, 
any agreement must deal with CO2 leakage by setting emissions limits for 
all. The primal remaining problem is how to share the burden of such targets 
between developed and developing countries.
With regard to bargaining power, China can afford to wait since it is relatively 
unaffected by climate change. Both India and China also prioritise present 
benefits and have strong views on historical responsibility and fairness. But 
delays on agreement increase the costs of climate stabilisation. To avoid 
this, transfers of finance and technology will be required soon to change the 
development paths of these countries. 
Developed countries, in contrast, are reluctant to agree transfers without 
commitments from developing countries, particularly if discussion of 
transfers remains open-ended. Fundamentally, what is missing is an agreed 
burden-sharing rule that acknowledges the need for development and yet 
makes concrete the constraints of climate change.
The Copenhagen Accord
The Copenhagen Accord is weak, though it achieved some successes. The 
fundamental asymmetries were recognised and consensus was reached 
on the aggregate target: a ceiling of a 2oC warming. On burden sharing, 
the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund was established to pay for mitigation 
and adaptation in developing countries. Funding will increase to US$ 100 
billion annually by 2020. The Accord also contains important text concerning 
verification and monitoring of emissions. Lastly, Copenhagen was preceded 
by proposals on CO2 emissions from China and India.
However, there remains no agreed mechanism to allocate emissions 
reductions and the sharing of the burden. The commitments to future 
emissions reductions are not credible without some means of enforcement. 
Currently, the practical limits of historical responsibility are ill-defined, 
making transfers to developing countries appear open-ended. 
Possibly because of this drawback, developed countries did not make 
strong commitments on emissions reductions. This precluded cooperation 
from India. China’s reluctance to agree to greater emissions reductions 
by developed countries probably reflected, in contrast, its preferences for 
growth and a fear of being similarly bound in the future. Lastly, ring fencing 
of aid budgets for climate-change assistance will be required to motivate 
other developing countries to cooperate.
Overall, the Copenhagen Accord made small steps towards defining targets, 
sharing burdens and identifying mechanisms to overcome asymmetries and 
secure cooperation. The delay in reaching binding commitments reflects the 
difficulties of reconciling stark asymmetries in the benefits and costs over 
time and space, and  differences in perceptions of fairness. 
Rightly or wrongly, historical responsibility has been a crucial principle in 
driving these perceptions of climate change, but the limits of historical 
responsibility must be defined somehow. This will entail defining an 
equitable development path for developing countries given the agreed 
constraints imposed by climate change mitigation. 
Only then will the required transfers of technology and finance from 
developed countries be defined. The Brazilian Proposal, if extended to 
include developing countries, provides a good starting point for this process, 
although many alternative interpretations exist (See Table). Depending on 
the definition of Emissions Source, developing countries have contributed 
between 12% and 39% to climate change. Different historical time horizons 
could also be considered. Irrespective of these factors, it is inevitable that 
cooperation will require agreeing the time at which history catches up with 
developing countries and their own responsibilities for mitigating climate 
change begin.
References:
Groom, Ben and J.R.J. Gatti, T. Goeschl and T. Swanson (Forthcoming in 2010). “Bargaining 
over Global Public Goods”, Chapter 12 in Brousseau, E., Dedeurwaerdere T., Jouvet P.-A. 
and  Willinger M. (eds). Global Environmental Commons: Analytical and Political Challenges in 
Building Governance Mechanisms. Oxford University Press.
La Rovere E.L., L.V. de Macedo and K.A. Baumert (2002). “The Brazilian Proposal on Relative 
Responsibility for Global Warming”. Ch 7 in K.A. Baumert (Editor), Options for Protecting the 
Climate. World Resources Institute, Washington DC.
Stern, Nicholas (2007). The Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change, Cabinet Office, 
HM Treasury, published by Cambridge University Press.
Emissions Source 
(Year of Temperature Change)









All CO2 + equivalents
e.g. land use change (1990) 61.1 38.9
All Fossil fuels (1990) 81.2 18.8
Energy Sector (1990) 88.0 12.0
Energy Sector (2010) 82.0 18.0
Energy Sector (2020) 79.0 21.0
Source:  Adapted from La Rovere et al. (2002)
Historical Responsibility: Measures 
based on Temperature Change
